A practical timing attack on RSA over a LAN

Mark J. Lodato; Ismail Jouny

doi:10.1117/12.673492

18 April 2006 A practical timing attack on RSA over a LAN

Mark J. Lodato, Ismail Jouny

Proceedings Volume 6241, Data Mining, Intrusion Detection, Information Assurance, and Data Networks Security 2006; 624111 (2006) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.673492
Event: Defense and Security Symposium, 2006, Orlando (Kissimmee), Florida, United States

Abstract

Today, the specific implementation of a cryptosystem is of possibly greater importance than the underlying cryptographic algorithm itself. Through side-channel cryptanalysis, an adversary may deduce a secret key just by monitoring implementation-specific side channels, such as execution time or power consumption during a cryptographic operation. In this paper, we describe a successful remote timing attack against a server running a protocol similar to SSL. Using a fully-automated attack on Chinese Remaindering Theorem (CRT) implementations of RSA, we show it is practical to recover a 1024-bit key in under an hour over a local area network.

Citation Download Citation

Mark J. Lodato and Ismail Jouny "A practical timing attack on RSA over a LAN", Proc. SPIE 6241, Data Mining, Intrusion Detection, Information Assurance, and Data Networks Security 2006, 624111 (18 April 2006); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.673492

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