KEYWORDS: Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing, Autocorrelation, Data communications, Data transmission, Telecommunications, Reliability, Radar signal processing, Design, Signal to noise ratio, Modulation
To meet the specific demands of airborne radar and communication systems, this study introduces an integrated radar-communication waveform design based on selecting the optimal dual sequence of complementary P4-OFDM signals. This waveform leverages the cyclic shift counts of complementary P4 codes to carry communication information, achieving dual functionality in target detection and data transmission. To enhance the data transmission rate, the study innovatively developed a dual cyclic shift signal, which expands the number of states represented by P4 codes using a pair of primary and secondary original sequences. This signal offers exceptionally high speed and distance resolution for radar detection and maintains a low bit error rate in communications, making it particularly suitable for airborne environments where the priority is on communication reliability over efficiency.
Compared with traditional encryption technology, physical layer security technology uses channel noise to realize the key with the same length as plaintext. Even if the eavesdropper has strong cracking computing power, it cannot decipher the confidential data without the key, which can truly realize “One-Time-Pad” and ensure the security of wireless communication. In this paper, we propose a physical layer security verification system based on software defined radio. In the system, base stations and legitimate users can obtain channel information efficiently, and eavesdroppers can use the powerful storage and computing resources of the cloud server to decrypt confidential signals without time constraints. Based on the system, this paper designs and verifies the physical layer security scheme with joint precoding and Artificial Noise, which fills the gap of the prototype verification platform of information-theoretic security and provides strong support for verifying the unconditional security features of the physical layer security technology.
Artificial noise, as a physical layer security technique, differs from traditional communication security mechanisms based on cryptography as it cannot be easily cracked by rapidly developing computational power. The theoretical research on the security of artificial-noise-assisted MIMO (Multiple-Input Multiple-Output) communication systems is quite comprehensive. However, the practical effectiveness of artificial noise in real-world systems still needs to be further validated through experimentation. This paper proposes a real-time platform for simulating experiments on MIMO communication systems assisted by artificial noise. By analyzing experimental data, it demonstrates that artificial noise has a slight impact on the reliability of legitimate MIMO communication systems while effectively enhancing system security.
This paper investigates the physical layer security in wireless communication networks, focusing on the scenario where a base station sends confidential messages to a legitimate node while facing potential eavesdropping. The study assumes that the channel state information for both authorized and unauthorized nodes is not available. To assess both security and reliability, the paper introduces the use of bit error rate (BER) as a quantifiable security metric. The objective of the research is to evaluate the security performance improvement of the system through BER. Specifically, the impact of artificial noise (AN) power allocation ratio, and the number of transceiver antennas on BER performance is characterized. The numerical results demonstrate that artificial noise is effective against unknown passive eavesdropping attacks and leads to significant performance gains. For instance, by transmitting artificial noise power at approximately 50% of the total power to deliberately impair the eavesdropper’s reception, the BER gap between intended and unauthorized users can reach 0.4.
KEYWORDS: Network security, Computer security, Computing systems, Data communications, Local area networks, Internet, Data transmission, Switches, Security technologies, Instrument modeling
Wi-Fi is a widely used wireless local area network (WLAN) technology, and its security issues have always been a matter of concern. The counter with CBC-MAC protocol (CCMP) is a commonly employed security protocol for Wi-Fi. However, vulnerabilities in the 4-way handshake process can allow attackers to carry out man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. In a successful attack, the targeted station (STA) connects to a rogue access point (AP) established by the MitM, which can have severe consequences for Wi-Fi users. This paper focuses on MitM attacks in the context of WPA2, CCMP, and WLAN security. We analyze and implement a MitM attack scenario, and based on this scenario, we summarize the potential hazards resulting from a successful attack. Furthermore, we present solutions to help prevent falling victim to such attacks.
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